





Throughout most of the 20th century, military con-
scription (the draft) was a prominent feature of na-
tional military doctrines. Both world wars were
fought mainly by conscripts.Among the 12 founding
countries of NATO in 1949,only Canada did not rely
on conscription (Iceland did and still does not have
armed forces). While the United Kingdom (1960),
Luxembourg (1967) and the United States (1973)
adopted all-volunteer forces quite early during the
Cold War, military conscription was the dominant
mode of peacetime recruitment in the alliance until
mid-1990s.Likewise,throughout the entire existence
(1955–91) of the Warsaw Pact, all its members used
conscription.
Figure 1 maps the changes in mil-
itary recruitment across Europe
since 1993 (after the break-up of
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia).
Initially only Ireland, Luxem-
bourg, Malta and the United
Kingdom relied on all-voluntary
service. In 2011, most countries
do. The only EU countries still
using conscription are Austria,
Cyprus, Denmark (in which it is
quite easy to avoid the service in
practice), Estonia, Finland and
Greece.
Figure 2 presents military recruitment regimes world-
wide. Conscription is still dominant in Asia and Africa.
In Latin America the use of conscription has been in a
steady decline, with (de facto) abolitions in Uruguay
(1989), Nicaragua (1990), Honduras (1994), Argentina
(1995), Peru (1999), Chile (2005) and Ecuador (2008).
While the decision to abolish or maintain the mili-
tary draft has country-specific aspects in each single
case, certain groups of motivations for the abolition
of conscription can be identified:
• Conscription in the US was abolished in 1973, to-
wards the end of the Vietnam War. Liberal defer-
ment rules and, later, the use of lotteries had gen-
erated a strong sense of the unfairness and biased
selectiveness of the draft system, which added to
the public discontent with the Vietnam War. In
the debate about the pros and cons of abolishing
the draft, economists (most notably Milton Fried-
man) had substantial impact, arguing that con-
scription is “inequitable, wasteful, and inconsis-
tent with a free society” (Friedman 1974, 253).
• In continental Europe, with its dominant histori-
cal view that every citizen has an obligation to
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perform some service at the call of the state, the
decline in the use of conscription followed the
end of the Cold War. After the collapse of the
Soviet Union and the end of the Warsaw Pact,
European governments no longer saw the need to
prepare for large-scale warfare in Europe. This
allowed many countries to seek budgetary savings
by reducing the sizes of armies and reserves. At
the same time, military capabilities were increas-
ingly aimed at peacekeeping and international
missions for which conscripts are ill-suited and,in
most countries,inadmissible by law.Military tech-
nology moved away from territorial mass forces
to smaller, mobile units equipped with sophisti-
cated weaponry, increasing the necessity of pro-
fessionalization. The smaller intake of draftees
raised equity concerns as conscription was no
longer hitting the full (male) age cohort but only
those unlucky enough to be called up to service.
• For the Baltic,central and eastern European coun-
tries, which all started out with conscript armies,
the prospect of NATO membership meant the
necessity of downsizing and restructuring their
armed forces.The role model of the alliance lead-
ers, increasing levels of draft avoidance, and the
public opinion that conscript forces were a vestige
of the Cold War or Soviet totalitarianism promot-
ed the eventual abolition of conscription in all
countries except for Estonia (Williams 2005).
• Many Latin American countries were ruled by
military dictatorships until the 1980s. The juntas
relied heavily on conscription for military reasons
(in border disputes and inner conflicts with Mar-
xist movements) as well as for sake of indoctrina-
tion and social control. During their regimes these
armies had amassed dismal records of reckless mili-
tarism,human rights violations,
economic mismanagement and
corruption.In the wake of demo-
cratization,armed forces suffered
considerable losses in prestige,
leading civilian goverments in
quite a number of countries to
abolish or suspend conscription.
Typically, also countries without
conscription during peacetime re-
tain the option to re-introduce
conscription in case of war – when
it might be infeasible to mobilize
the necessary manpower by vol-
unteers or through fiscal taxes
alone. Similar arguments can explain the use of con-
scription in countries like Israel, where the military
doctrine relies on the ability to mobilize most citi-
zens to fight in case of a large-scale conflict.
Generally,there is a positive correlation between the
military threat perceived by countries and their use
of conscription (Mjoset and van Holde 2002). The
recent abolishment of military draft in several
European countries can then be explained by (the
perception of) reduced military threat after the fall
of the Iron Curtain.
The economic case against conscription
Economists traditionally were and are unambiguous
in favoring a volunteer army (for surveys see Sandler
and Hartley 1995, chapter 6; Warner and Asch 2001
or Poutvaara and Wagener 2007a, 2011), echoing
Adam Smith’s verdict of the “irresistible superiority
which a well-regulated standing [i.e., all-volunteer]
army has over a militia [i.e., temporary conscrip-
tion]” (Smith 1976, 701). Smith’s arguments focus on
comparative advantage and the benefits from spe-
cialization. Military conscription violates the princi-
ple of comparative advantage, which demands that
jobs be assigned to those who are relatively most
productive in doing them, by forcing everybody into
a military occupation, irrespective of relative pro-
ductivities. In consequence, the match between peo-
ple and jobs will be inefficient. Benefits from spe-
cialization arise when individuals become more pro-
ductive due to experience and frequent practice.
Effective military operations require a considerable
degree of training and mastery in handling complex
weapon systems. Drafted short-term soldiers are in-
ferior to long-term professionals. In combat, the use
of less advanced military technology,lack of training,
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“Conscription” and selected government sources.and the easy availability of apparently expendable
soldiers lead to higher casualties and “cannon-fod-
der”-type battlefield tactics.1
Consequences of the abolition of conscription
Military expenditures, personnel  and budgets
While quite a number of countries have abolished
conscription over the past 20 years, a comparative
study of their experiences – military, fiscal or econo-
mic – is still missing.In parts,this is due to the fact that
the abolition of the draft generally runs parallel to
other changes (say, shifts in political regimes, geo-
political developments or military technologies) that
make it difficult to isolate the “pure” draft effects.
Econometric analyses are not available, and compar-
isons have to be based on rough summary indicators.
For the government budget,oper-
ating a draft system is generally
cheaper than a professional army.
Conscripts are not paid the mar-
ket value of their labor service and
are granted fringe benefits such as
health plans, family support, old-
age provisions, etc., on a much
smaller scale than professional sol-
diers (if at all). These savings are
partially offset by the generally
smaller size of all-volunteer forces
(allowed for due to increased pro-
ductivity). In an early study, Oneal
(1992) found that budgetary sav-
ings from conscription in NATO
averaged around 9.2 percent of
national military expenditures in
1974, but decreased subsequently
to only 5.7 percent in 1987.Warner
and Asch (2001) report that the
budgetary costs of abolishing con-
scription in the US in 1973 came at
10 to 15 percent of the 1965 mili-
tary budget (which was chosen as a
reference point to exclude the
effect of the Vietnam War).
Similar studies are, to our knowledge, not available
for the more recent abolitions of military conscrip-
tion, say, in European NATO members. However,
some summary indicators may also provide interest-
ing insights. Compared to the 1980s, the “militariza-
tion” of society has declined across NATO, both in
terms of the share of the labor force working for the
military (a decline from an average of 2.7 to 1.1 per-
cent between the late 1980s and the late 2000s) and,
with the notable exception of the US over the past
decade, defense expenditures as a share of GDP,
which dropped from an average of 4.8 to 2.9 percent
(NATO 2010). For more detailed comparisons, we
group “old” NATO countries (i.e., members as of
1985) in Figures 3 and 4 according to their recruit-
ment regimes.
As Figure 3 shows, there are no obvious differences
in military expenditure trends between “old” NATO
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Source: Own calculations based on NATO (2010), p. 4.
in % of labour force
 MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL IN THE ARMED FORCES OF
  "OLD" NATO MEMBERS, 1985–2009
(a) Unweighted averages across 1985 NATO members using conscription over full period, 1985–2009 (DK, 
GE, GR, NO, TK).     (b) Unweighted averages across 1985 NATO members which abolished conscription 
after 1985 (BE, FR, IT, NL, PT, SP). 
























Source: Own calculations based on NATO (2010), p. 9.
% of GDP
 DEFENCE EXPENDITURES OF "OLD" NATO MEMBERS, 1985–2009
in 2000 prices
(a) Unweighted averages across 1985 NATO members using conscription over full period, 1985–2009 (DK, 
GE, GR, NO, TK).     (b) Unweighted averages across 1985 NATO members which abolished conscription 
after 1985 (BE, FR, IT, NL, PT, SP). 
Luxembourg is omitted as an outlier.
5-year averages
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members that never had, always had or abolished
conscription, except for different starting levels.
There is no clear correlation between military ex-
penditure and the use of conscription; if anything,
countries with conscription seem to afford larger
military budgets. As Figure 4 (quite unsurprisingly)
indicates, the share of people working for the mili-
tary is higher in conscription countries. Remarkably,
the reduction in army personnel has been largest in
conscription countries, both in absolute and in rela-
tive terms (which may indicate a problem of unfair-
ness due to selective draft calls).A bit more surpris-
ingly, there is no indication that the abolition of con-
scription led to disruptions in army sizes or military
budgets that would not, in similar orders of magni-
tude, occur also in countries that did not change mil-
itary regimes.
Conscription involves a distorted factor-price ratio
between labor and other military production factors,
leading to an excessive staffing of armies and too lit-
tle investment. This is indeed reflected in military
budgets: as Figure 5 illustrates, military budgets in
countries with all-volunteer forces are less person-
nel-intensive than in conscription countries.
Remarkably, the share of personnel expenditures
has always been highest in the group of countries
that decided, in the 1990s and early 2000s, to abolish
conscription.The relatively flat trend of these coun-
tries in Figure 5 should be interpreted with some
caution; the averaging across countries flattens di-
vergent trends in single countries. Upon suspension
of conscription, the costs of personnel in the total
defense budget decreased in the Netherlands, Spain
and Portugal but increased considerably in Belgium
and Italy. The interpretation also changes with the
definition of personnel expenditure.Using a narrow-
er definition that only accounts for military (but not
for civilian) personnel, Buch (2010) reports that the
share of personnel expenditure rose upon the suspen-
sion of conscription from 41 to 50 percent in Spain,
from 30 to 37 percent in France, from 43 to 58 percent
in Belgium – but decreased from 47 to 36 percent in the
Netherlands.Again, there seems to be no general rule.
This picture is mirrored by changes in the share of
investment and other expenditures: where there was
a relative increase in personnel expenditure, there
was a relative cut in investments – and vice versa.
Intangible and indirect effects
Although budgetary costs of conscription are small-
er, its total social costs are likely to be substantially
larger than with an all-volunteer army. The use of
compulsion in itself suggests that the real costs of
conscription are higher than its budgetary ones, and
abolishing the draft will save society these opportu-
nity costs.Using empirical methods that were sophis-
ticated for their time, Oi (1967, 59) conservatively
estimated the opportunity costs of the US military
draft in the late 1960s to be around USD 5.3 billion
(in 1960 values),when budgetary personnel expendi-
ture amounted to USD 12.7 billion. Kerstens and
Meyermans (1993) estimate that the social cost of
the (abolished) draft system in Belgium amounted to
twice its budgetary cost.
Economically, military draft is an (in-kind) tax, and
shares with all other taxes the feature that it is not
neutral but rather induces substantial avoidance ac-
tivities and,thus causes economic
distortions and deadweight los-
ses. For example, conscription
goes along with various ways of
“dodging”,inefficient employment,
preemptive emigration, pretended
schooling, hasty marriages, bribing
recruitment officers, faking med-
ical certificates, etc. These hard-
to-be-measured costs would be
saved in case of abolition.
By postponing, interrupting or
even discouraging higher educa-
tion and entry into the labor mar-
ket, conscription also has a nega-
tive effect on the accumulation of



















Source: Own calculations based on NATO (2010), p. 6.
in % of defence expenditures
 SHARE OF PERSONNEL EXPENDITURES, 1985–2009
(a) Unweighted averages across 1985 NATO members using conscription over full period, 1985–2009 (DK, 
GE, GR, NO, TK).     (b) Unweighted averages across 1985 NATO members which abolished conscription 
after 1985 (BE, FR, IT, NL, PT, SP). Until 1995 without France, until 1990 without Spain. 
Luxembourg is omitted as an outlier.
5-year averages
Figure 52010 and the references therein). At the macro
level, the disruption of human capital investments
by military conscription translates into lower stocks
of human capital, reduced labor productivity and
substantial losses in GDP (Lau et al. 2004). From
1960 to 2000,GDP growth rates in OECD countries
with conscription were lower by up to a quarter per-
centage point than in countries with all-volunteer
forces (Keller et al. 2009). This is remarkably large
given that military expenditures or the size of the
military labor force per se do not seem to exert any
systematic effect on GDP and its growth (Dunne et
al. 2005).
Transition problems
The experiences of countries that switched from con-
script to all-volunteer forces show that the transition
is rocky (Warner and Asch 2001; Williams 2005;
Rostker 2006; Buch 2010). Initially, all countries seem
to have problems in meeting their requirements for
staffing and quality in the military. Enticing new
recruits to join the forces is difficult, turnover rates
are high, imbalances across occupational specialties
arise, with too few people with the cognitive apti-
tudes, skills, technical abilities and work experiences
useful in professional armies. Projected savings may
only materialize later than anticipated since, e.g., the
military pay, post-service benefits and working and
living conditions to attract new staff turn out to be
more costly than foreseen, the extant staff needs re-
training, redundant military bases cannot be closed
down immediately, etc.
Such difficulties may lead some to call into question
the efficiency gains attributed to all-volunteer forces.
Thus, the share of the military budget devoted to
personnel actually increased during the first few
years after the 1973 abolition of conscription in the
US, in spite of a reduction in army size (Williams
2005). Physical or intellectual recruitment standards
for soldiers have been lowered in several countries
(Williams 2005; Buch 2010). In the Netherlands, some
army units remained understaffed, and France
appears to have down-scaled its ambitions for out-of-
area deployability of its armed forces (Buch 2010).
These non-negligible transitory problems do, how-
ever,not qualify as arguments against all-volunteer
forces. Rather, they merely reflect to what dramat-
ic extent conscription insulated the military from a
most elementary feature of standard labor mar-
kets:if one wishes to hire staff in sufficient number
and of decent quality, pay and working conditions
have to be competitive with the qualification and
outside options of those one wishes to hire. As
Warner and Asch (2001) demonstrate for the US,
eventually the economists’ predictions have borne
out: efficiency gains of the all-volunteer force were
reaped with the additional benefit that the bud-
getary costs for military personnel reflect its true
economic costs.
Myths about the draft
Proponents of the military draft argue that the oppor-
tunity costs of conscription are tolerable since they
are compensated for by additional societal,military or
political advantages of conscription over all-volunteer
forces. However, a closer look at these alleged extra
benefits of conscription reveals that they are largely
mythical.
Myth 1:A conscript military is more “representative”
of society than a professional army.
All-volunteer forces are thought to prey dispropor-
tionately on the poorly educated, the lower classes,
ethnic minorities or otherwise marginalized strata of
society. By contrast, conscription is considered to be
more egalitarian since all are included in universal
service.
In fact, there is hardly any reason to believe that
conscription makes the military (more) representa-
tive. First, a genuine cross-section of the population
in the army was never the aim in conscription coun-
tries:conscription covered substantially less than 50
percent of the population; it excluded women,
migrants and often certain religious groups, fathers
or gays. Second, even for its main targets (young
males), the military draft is de facto biased, typical-
ly favoring individuals of high socio-economic or
educational status with shorter terms of service,
complete exemptions, legal and illegal buyout
options or privileged work conditions (e.g., doctors
or athletes).Third, the claim that the social compo-
sition in all-volunteer forces is more biased towards
the disadvantaged than in conscript armies is still
open to debate.2
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Myth 2: Conscription promotes peace
It is sometimes argued that a conscript army, which
draws from all quarters of society, provides a check
on military adventurism since it cannot be deployed
without a fair measure of public support. Empirical-
ly, this “peacemaker” argument is dubious. In fact,
the military draft may even contribute to a milita-
rization of society by instilling in conscripts the view
that killing for the home country is a patriotic duty.
The possible legitimization for the production and
use of violence may even raise the likelihood and
severity of armed conflicts. Studying violent inter-
state conflicts from 1886 to 1992, Choi and James
(2003) find that a military manpower system based
on conscripted soldiers is associated with more mili-
tary disputes than professional or voluntary armies.
Similarly,Anderson et al. (1996) conclude that “war-
like” states are more likely to rely on conscription.
Linking conscription with democracy changes this
picture somewhat (Vasquez 2005); still, there is no
convincing evidence that the military draft has any
mediating effect on the likelihood or severity of in-
ternational military disputes.
Within societies,conscription may even contribute to
brutalization: Using data on Argentine draft lotter-
ies, Galiani et al. (2011) show that having been con-
scripted increases the likelihood of developing a
criminal record; this holds also for those who served
during peacetime.
Myth 3: Conscription is a better match with democra-
cy than all-volunteer armies 
Military conscription is often attributed with a
greater affinity with democracy than an all-volunteer
force.Army structures,which operate on the basis of
order and command rather than on voting,are inher-
ently non-democratic. Still conscripts may act as
mediators between a society and its army, while a
professional military tends to alienate from society
and form a “state within a state”.Advocates of con-
scription appeal to the soldat citoyen, referring back
to the origins of modern draft in France and Prussia,
as a figure that bridges the gap between army and
civil society.
Economically, the “isolation” of the military from
the rest of society is just an example of an increased
division of labor. In a sense, every specialized work-
er is “alienated” in his work from the rest of society,
but calls for compulsory internships of all members
of society in any or all sectors of the economy have
so far been unheard of. But even if the alienation
from the rest of society were particularly trouble-
some in the military, conscription is not a solution.
Praetorian tendencies are most likely to emerge
from the officers’ corps, which has always consisted
of professionals. Moreover, the democratic controls
arising from a draft are open to debate. In democra-
tic countries like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Greece or
Turkey conscription did not help to prevent military
coups in the past. Conversely, recent experiences
from Latin America demonstrate that democratiza-
tion and the abolition of conscription may be inter-
twined. Exemplarily democratic countries (like the
UK, the US, Australia, Canada or New Zealand)
have traditionally run all-volunteer armies without
ever facing the risk of regime change or military
coups. All these observations as well as the econo-
metric evidence established by Mulligan and Shleifer
(2005) and Pfaffenzeller (2010) indicate that no
causality in whatever direction exists between the
form of government and the structure of armed
forces in a country.
Myth 4: Conscription provides better reserves
A precautionary argument in favor of military con-
scription is that it provides manpower reserves to
augment the regular army in the case of a military
emergency. If this argument should imply that re-
serves cannot be maintained with all-volunteer forces,
then it is empirically false,as the examples of all coun-
tries with professional armies show. Moreover, the
reserve argument loses validity if reservists are not
appropriately prepared for their assignments in case
of mobilization.
A key issue for maintaining militarily meaningful re-
serves is that reservists are paid sufficient compensa-
tion for their participation in regular exercises. Such
contracted (as contrasted to conscripted) reservists
would make the true opportunity costs of alternative
military strategies visible and help to allocate re-
sources efficiently between personnel and material.
Obstacles for abolition
The inefficiency of conscription results to a great ex-
tent from ignoring comparative advantage and spe-
cialization, which results in higher social costs than
with a voluntary army.At the same time, there is no
empirical support for the claim that the use of con-scription would help to protect democracy, promote
social cohesion or tame belligerence.Given that hard-
ly any argument in favor of the draft survives under
closer scrutiny,the question arises why so many coun-
tries still have a hard time in eliminating conscription
or do not even consider it. A number of obstacles to
the abolition of the military draft are conceivable:
Special interests:Several societal groups benefit from
conscription – and therefore favor it. These include
labor unions (that favor conscription as it keeps
potential competitors off the private labor market;
see Anderson et al. (1996) for empirical support),
bureaucracies (for reasons of inertia and fear of or-
ganizational change),the military itself (which might
fear a loss in their social status, importance and visi-
bility), or regional interests (in areas where military
bases would become redundant by the absence of
conscripts). Special mention goes to the various or-
ganizations and firms in the welfare industry that
benefit from the cheap labor provided by conscien-
tious objectors to military service. Needless to say –
we hope – all economic arguments against forced
labor in the military also apply mutatis mutandis in
the social sector.
Intergenerational issues: From an intergenerational
perspective,military conscription is similar to a pay-as-
you-go pension scheme: its introduction is a (tempo-
rary) way around higher fiscal taxes, the static in-
efficiencies remain largely unnoticed and its dynamic
costs only surface with considerable time lags. As for
an unfunded pension scheme, starting a draft scheme
means making a “gift” (in the form of a reduced fiscal
tax burden) to the cohorts that are beyond draft age at
that moment.Such a gift may be revolved from cohort
to cohort, but it can never be undone in a Pareto-
improving manner (Poutvaara and Wagener 2007b).
The abolition of the draft would impose an extra fiscal
burden on age cohorts beyond the draft age. Since
these largely outnumber younger cohorts at or below
the draft age, retaining military draft garners wide-
spread political support. The casual observation that
the staunchest advocates of conscription usually come
from age groups well above draft age provides support
for this view.
Non-democratic and developing countries: In non-
democratic regimes – which are currently the dominant
users of conscription – popular support for conscrip-
tion is less politically relevant.In these cases,aspects of
indoctrination,intimidation and social control,the eco-
nomic benefits to the ruling cliques from exploiting
their populations by forced labor and the desire to
maintain numerically large armies seem to be attrac-
tive features of military draft.For developing countries,
with their inability to raise sufficient fiscal revenues
and their generally lower opportunity costs of labor,
the in-kind tax of military draft could even be econom-
ically efficient from an optimal-tax perspective.
Conclusions
Conscription is an inefficient form of recruiting sol-
diers for an army. As the strikingly positive experi-
ences of the UK or the US exemplify, its abolition
therefore is worthwhile – in spite of transition prob-
lems and potentially negative effect on government
budgets. All-volunteer forces deliver modern, high-
technology defense capabilities at lower and more
transparent instantaneous and dynamic costs than
their conscript counterparts.
Each country’s decision to retain or eliminate con-
scription is motivated by a unique array of different
factors (although, as in France or Germany, con-
scription may happen to be abolished in an almost
cavalier way). Economic arguments unfortunately
appear to focus primarily on the state in terms of
budgetary expenditures and military capabilities.
The adverse effects of conscription on the well-being
of individual citizens and the substantial excess bur-
den of the draft tax rarely enter into the discussion.
More empirical research on these issues may con-
tribute to the final elimination of peacetime con-
scription and related forms of forced labor.
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